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Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado
and Free Speech Balancing in the
United States and Canada
BY DONALD L. BESCHLE*
INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 2000, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Hill v. Colorado,' upholding a Colorado statute
that severely limits the activity of protestors or "sidewalk counselors"
within one hundred feet of the entrance to a health care facility.2
Released on the same day on which the Court struck down
Nebraska's ban on "partial birth" abortions 3 the decision was,
unsurprisingly, treated as primarily about the scope of the abortion
right.4 But Hill was only partially about abortion; primarily, the case
addressed the scope of the First Amendment free speech guarantee.
While much surely will be said concerning Hill's impact on abortion
rights, we might also ask what the case suggests about how the Court
may analyze free speech claims in the future. Does the presence of
the abortion issue make Hill an anomaly, or is the case instead
consistent with trends in First Amendment interpretation, and
therefore instructive about the future?
Much of the debate concerning proper methods of constitutional
* Professor, The John Marshall Law School; B.A., Fordham University; J.D., New
York University School of Law; L.L.M., Temble University School of Law.
1. 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000)
2. Id. at 2484. The statute at issue was Section 18-9-122(3) Colo. Rev. Stat. (1999).
3. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
4. See, e.g., headlines reporting the decisions, Edward Welsh and Amy Goldstein,
"Supreme Court Upholds Two Key Abortion Rights," WASH. POST, June 29,2000, at Al.
In his roundup of First Amendment cases for the National Law Journal's annual analysis
of the Supreme Court's recent term. Prof. Bernard James did not mention Hill. Bernard
James, "No Landmarks Among First Amendment Cases," NAT. L.J., August 7, 2000, at
A27.
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interpretation can be seen as a clash between those advocating
adherence to absolute principle, and those contending that
constitutional decision making must be a process of balancing
competing interests. The scope of the debate is familiar by now: the
dangers of indeterminacy versus the need for flexibility; the need to
consider the empirical consequences of decisions versus the danger of
a "slippery slope" eroding rules that have proven their practical
value. Neither side of the debate has come close to vanquishing the
other, in courtrooms or in the academic literature.
Perhaps this stalemate endures because the arguments on each
side are evenly balanced, or perhaps it is due to the fact that the
choice is essentially one of value preferences not subject to refutation.
It is also possible, however, that the persistence of the dispute
between absolute principle and balancing is a consequence of placing
too much stock in the semantics of the distinction. If both balancing
and adherence to principle are, to some extent, unavoidable, then the
notion that one must choose between them becomes questionable at
best. Further, if it becomes apparent that absolute principles emerge
as the product of a process that suspiciously resembles balancing, and
that conversely, balancing inevitably is done in the shadow of these
principles and with the understanding of their origin in years of
empirical testing, then the wall between the two approaches hardly
seems sturdy.
One way to examine differences between the balancing and anti-
balancing approaches is to compare the experience of Canadian
courts in interpreting and applying the provisions of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms with the analogous work of the
United States Supreme Court in its constitutional cases. The
Canadian Charter explicitly instructs courts to engage in a form of
balancing.5 One might say that Canada has clearly rejected the idea
of absolute principles. Or, one might say that Canada has adopted
balancing itself as a principle, or at least a method that can be
described as principled.
In contrast, the language of the United States Constitution often
suggests the application of absolutes, and this has allowed American
critics of balancing to charge that trimming the sails of principle is a
5. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11. sched. B
(U.K.)[hereinafter, Canada Act, 1982]. In pertinent part, Section One states: "The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society."
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betrayal of the Constitution's purpose as a firm bulwark against
governmental abuse. Yet even critics of balancing almost inevitably
discover that they must sometimes resort to it. Sometimes this is
done openly, with a sigh of regret that pragmatic concerns make the
application of absolutes impossible. Other times this is accomplished
through semantic gymnastics - by redefining the "absolute rule" to
narrow it in largely the same way that balancing itself would.
In United States constitutional law, advocacy for absolute
adherence to principle has been most vigorous and has had its most
lasting effect on First Amendment free speech issues. While the
Supreme Court has avoided speaking in absolutes, it has often
constructed First Amendment tests that come very close to absolute
rules, at least on their face.6 Within such a free speech jurisprudence,
Hill does seem somewhat anomalous. But this article will attempt to
demonstrate that the contrast between an analysis that explicitly
balances rights and interests and one that, on the surface, rejects such
an approach is far less drastic than might be expected. As we will also
see, however, this does not mean that the debate lacks significance.
The level of enthusiasm that one has for judicial balancing may well
have an effect on how that balancing proceeds. Even balancers will
need to adopt at times some strategies from the anti-balancing camp
in order to make their conclusions palatable.
An examination of United States and Canadian approaches to
free speech issues reveals several things. First, constitutional
language is only a limited restraint on the judicial function, at least in
controversial cases. Absolute language does not preclude a court
from balancing interests, nor does an explicit command to balance
preclude a court from drawing bright lines. Second, the way in which
balancing is done will differ depending on a society's history and
expectations concerning the relative importance not only of
individual rights and social interests, but also of the role of courts and
legislatures in the lawmaking process. Third, while balancing tests are
often criticized for giving courts too much power, they can just as
easily be employed to bolster the final authority of the legislature.
6. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (articulating the extremely high
standard for sustaining prior restraints) ([T]he protection.., is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases."). See also, Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 450 (1969) (setting forth a vigorous version of the clear and
present danger test)("[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.").
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And finally, we will see that Hill may not be anomalous at all, but
rather that it signifies, along with other developments, a perhaps
unacknowledged drift on the part of the United States Supreme
Court toward the use of Canadian-style balancing in free speech
cases, and away from bright-line tests with sharply-drawn categorical
boundaries.
This article will begin with a description of Hill v. Colorado and a
brief description of the traditional approach of the United States
Supreme Court to free speech issues. Then this article will examine
the basic structure of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
focusing on its similarities to and differences from the Bill of Rights
of the United States Constitution. This is followed by an examination
of United States and Canadian responses to several current,
controversial free speech issues. Finally, this article will compare
recent Canadian and United States free speech decisions. It will
analyze what they reveal about the role of balancing tests in
constitutional rights cases and what Hill might say about the United
States Supreme Court's overall approach to First Amendment claims,
beyond the point at which they intersect with abortion rights.
I. HILL v. COLORADO - WRESTLING WITH
LONGSTANDING UNITED STATES APPROACHES TO
FREE SPEECH
The language of the First Amendment seems both clear and
absolute. Congress and the states, through the amendment's
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment,7 shall make no law
abridging freedom of speech.' But from the earliest days of First
Amendment jurisprudence,9 the Supreme Court has recognized that
the provision cannot mean precisely what it says. Pragmatic concerns
have led the Court to trim the amendment in order to accommodate
pressing governmental interests. Even Justice Hugo Black, perhaps
best remembered for his belief that the amendment was to be
regarded as an absolute, was able to uphold government regulation in
some cases by defining "speech" narrowly enough to eliminate some
7. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927), the Supreme Court first applied the free speech guarantees to the states
through the substantive part of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
although, in each case the Court upheld the state statute in question.
8. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
9. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919) is generally regarded as the
starting point of significant Supreme Court free speech jurisprudence.
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forms of expression from the scope of the amendment."
But while Justice Black's call for First Amendment absolutism
was never accepted by his judicial colleagues, the Court did have to
address the strong language of the provision. If absolute protection
of speech was to be rejected in favor of some sort of balancing of the
right against government interests, then how was the balance to be
struck? For the most part, the Court answered this question by
creating categories of speech and of government action, and adopting
tests that were more or less protective of each speech category. Some
categories of cases would call for the application of strict scrutiny, a
test that generations of lawyers came to regard as nearly
insurmountable; others would call for the application of the low-level
"rational basis" test, one that government was almost always assured
of satisfying. Strict scrutiny or some variant of it would be
appropriate where government attempted to censor or punish
speech, 2 or regulate it on the basis of its content;3 low-level scrutiny
would be used when government regulated in a "content-neutral"
way. In addition, certain categories of speech were identified as being
beyond the scope of First Amendment protection.14 Through this
process of categorization, the Court has been able to reconcile
absolutism - or the near-absolutism of classic strict scrutiny - with
the practical need to balance rights and interests (in the process of
categorizing, rather than balancing in each case).
It is against this (obviously simplified) background that the
Supreme Court addressed Hill v. Colorado. Hill and other "sidewalk
10. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27-8 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) where
Justice Black agreed that wearing a jacket with a vulgar slogan is "conduct" rather than
speech; Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 515-26 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting) where Justice Black maintains that wearing an armband as part of an antiwar
protest by public school students may be prohibited; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
594-605 (1969) (Warren, C.J. dissenting) where Justice Black joined in an opinion
maintaining that flag desecration may be punished. See also, HUGO BLACK, A
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45-63 (1968) for a statement setting forth Justice Black's
absolutism. and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting) for Justice Black's specific rejection of "balancing."
11. See Near, 283 U.S. at 721; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971).
12. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448; Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 US. 886 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (content-based forum restriction
subjected to strict scrutiny); Police Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)(same).
14. See infra notes 64-132 (commercial speech), notes 162-178 (hate speech); notes
220-232 (obscenity/pornography) with accompanying text.
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counselors"'15 challenged the constitutionality of a Colorado statute1
6
that, among other things, prohibited anyone within one hundred feet
of the entrance of a health care facility from approaching another
person, without consent, in order to distribute leaflets, display a sign,
or "engage in oral protest, education, or counseling. 1 7 The statute
did not explicitly refer to anti-abortion protesters, although activity
outside the premises of abortion providers was the obvious cause of
its enactment. Colorado's legislature stated the purposes of the act
and explicitly spoke of the need to strike a balance: "the exercise of a
person's right to protest or compel against certain medical procedures
must be balanced against another person's right to obtain medical
counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner.""i
Standard First Amendment analysis, as outlined above, calls for
quick categorization of the restriction at issue. The statute does not
bar or punish a message wherever it is delivered, therefore it should
be analyzed as a restriction on the place and manner of delivery."
The crucial classification decision was whether the statute should be
regarded as sensitive to the content, and even the viewpoint"0 of the
speaker and therefore, subject to the near absolute condemnation
that follows the application of strict scrutiny; or as content-neutral,
subject to a much less stringent test.
The majority, focusing resolutely on the language of the statute,
found it content-neutral.2' After all, the statute applied to all
viewpoints and all health care facilities.' Having reached this
conclusion, the Court proceeded to apply the standard found in Ward
15. 120 S. Ct. at 2485 ("Sidewalk counseling" consists of efforts "to educate, counsel,
persuade, or inform passersby about abortion and abortion alternatives by means of
verbal or written speech, including conversation and/or display of signs and/or distribution
of literature.").
16. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999). Petitioners did not challenge the
narrower provisions of subsection (2), which makes it a misdemeanor to "'knowingly
obstruct[ ], detain[ ], hinder[ ], impede[ ], or blocko]" entry or exit from a health care
facility. 120 S. Ct at 2485.
17. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (1999).
19. See 120 S. Ct. at 2494 (characterizing the statute as a time, place or manner
restriction) and 2503-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same, but arguing that it is not content-
neutral).
20. See Perry Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators Assoc., 460 U.S. 37,63-66 (1983).
A government regulation that is viewpoint sensitive does not simply discriminate on the
basis of the subject matter of a message, but goes further and discriminates against a
particular viewpoint on an otherwise permitted subject.
21. 120 S. Ct. at 2491.
22. Id. at 2490.
[Vol. 28
CLEARLY CANADIAN
v. Rock Against Racism.' This test, less severe than strict scrutiny,
demands only that the government restriction be "narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest,"' and leave open "ample
alternative channels of communication."'  Citing earlier cases that
recognized the government's interest in protecting "captive
audiences" from unwelcome messages, the Court found that
Colorado's purpose "to protect those who seek medical treatment
from... potential physical and emotional harm"26 was valid and
significant. The restrictions of the statute satisfied the requirement of
narrow tailoring.27
The dissenters took issue with the Court's characterization of the
statute as content and viewpoint neutral.' Looking beyond the
language of the statute to the realities behind the enactment, they saw
a provision aimed entirely at those who opposed abortion.' In light
of this, they argued, the proper standard was the highest form of strict
scrutiny, and since the statute banned polite, quiet, considerate
"sidewalk counseling" as well as disturbing, offensive, and loud
expression, the statute should be invalidated.'
The outcome of Hill was largely determined by the choice of the
23. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
24. Id. at 791.
25. Id.
26. 120 S. Ct. at 2494. The Court cites, among other cases, Lehman v. Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974) (protecting a "captive audience" justifies ban on political advertising
on public bus system); Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (restrictions
on drive-in movie theaters went too far in protecting unwilling viewers) and, most
strongly, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). Frisby upheld an ordinance prohibiting
targeted picketing of a particular residence. Although the statute in Frisby was also
motivated by anti-abortion protests, the Court also treated the ordinance as content-
neutral. The Court in Hill points out that both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, two of
Hill's three dissenters, joined in the decision in Frisby. See 120 S. Ct. at 2494.
27. 120 S. Ct. at 2494.
28. 120 S. Ct. at 2503-4 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
29. Id. at 2503 ("I have no doubt that this regulation would be deemed content-based
in an instant if the case before us involved antiwar protestors, or union members seeking
to 'educate' the public about the reasons for their strike.").
30. Id. at 2511. Justice Scalia puts forward a hypothetical counselor who "wish[es] to
walk alongside and to say, sympathetically and as softly as the circumstances allow,
something like: 'My dear, I know what you are going through. I've been through it myself.
You're not alone and you do not have to do this. There are other alternatives. Will you
let me help you?"' Id. The majority obviously had a different mental picture of sidewalk
counseling. They cite to testimony before the Colorado legislators that "protestors 'are
flashing their bloody fetus signs. They are yelling 'you are killing your baby,' they are
talking about fetuses and babies being dismembered, arms and legs torn off ....'" 120 S.
Ct. at 2486 n.7.
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appropriate test to apply. If strict scrutiny had been applied, which
in its strongest form is akin to a per se test of invalidity, then no doubt
the dissenters were correct; the statute should fall. But the rejection
of strict scrutiny and the application of the Ward standard provided
the Court with much more flexibility. The Ward test, which does not
preclude a court from striking the balance either for or against any
but the most trivial or severe restrictions, would seem to be little
more than a statement that the Court is authorized to engage in case-
by-case balancing with all of its virtues and vices.
While the Colorado statute is seemingly content neutral, surely
the dissenters are justified in seeing it as primarily, if not exclusively,
concerned with the actions of advocates of a particular viewpoint.
Yet to concede that point, under the standard rules applied to First
Amendment categories, would mean that the Court would have to
disregard the equally obvious fact that the statute is far from a severe
restriction on general advocacy of anti-abortion views and that
protecting people in stressful environments from unwanted
harassment is hardly an obviously illegitimate government purpose.
The majority recognized that this case seems to cry out for some sort
of balancing, as opposed to an absolute or near-absolute approach,
but in order to apply such a test, the Court had to strain within the
boundaries of currently accepted First Amendment categories.
The Hill dissenters have little doubt about what is going on here.
In their view, the majority's nearly fanatical obsession with protecting
the abortion right has led to an outcome that flouts all accepted free
speech principles.' But is Hill's application of a flexible form of
balancing entirely inconsistent with past and contemporary free
speech jurisprudence? Or is it perhaps indicative of a trend toward
such balancing? And just as important, if such a trend exists, to what
extent is it a threat to important free speech values?
One helpful way of exploring these questions is to compare the
free speech analysis of the United States under the First Amendment
with the free speech analysis in Canada, a nation with which the
United States shares much in common, yet where the system of
judicial review expressly instructs courts to apply balancing principles.
31. See id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Hill] is patently incompatible with the
guarantees of the First Amendment," and it is part of "the 'ad hoc nullification machine'
that the Court has set in motion to push aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law
stand in the way of [abortion]." ).
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H. THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
Before discussing specific free speech issues, it will be helpful to
briefly sketch the general approach of the Canadian Constitution7 to
issues involving claims of individual rights. While many of the fights
enumerated in the Canadian Constitution are the same found in the
United States Constitution, there are significant differences in the
way in which those rights are to be weighed and enforced. The
Canadian Constitution was built upon the British foundation of
parliamentary supremacy. The legislature, then, is regarded as the
final guardian of individual rights; unelected officials will hold
subordinate, if still significant, roles.
The foundation document of Canadian constitutionalism, the
British North America Act of 1867,' addresses the division of
authority between national and provincial legislatures. Canadian
courts over the years have invalidated legislation on the grounds that
either level of government has invaded the powers of the other.' But,
consistent with British notions of parliamentary supremacy, the Act
does not limit legislative power when exercised by the proper unit of
government.-
In the years following World War II, many Canadians became
troubled by the sole reliance on ordinary legislation for the protection
of individual rights.37 This concern along with questions of federalism
32. The "basic framework of the Canadian constitution" which transferred, in stages,
sovereign power from Great Britain to its former colony, consists of three British statutes:
the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865, 28 and 29 Vict., Ch. 63 (U.K.); the British North
American Act of 1867, 30 and 31 Vict., Ch. 3 (U.K.); and the Statute of Westminster of
1931, 22 George V., Ch .4. See, G. GALL, THE CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 46 (1977).
These statutes were joined in Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canada Act, 1982, ch.
11, sched. B [hereinafter Canada Act, 1982], which contains the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
33. The classic defense of parliamentary supremacy was put forward by A. Dicey,
who contended that "the permanent wishes of the representative portion of Parliament
can hardly in the long run differ from the wishes of the sovereign and the wishes of the
subjects .... " A. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 83 (10th ed. 1959). See also,
Roderick MacDonald, Procedural Due Process in Canadian Constitutional Law. Natural
Justice and Fundamental Justice, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 217, 220-30 (1987) (discussing the
legal culture underlying the Canadian doctrine of parliamentary supremacy).
34. See GALl, supra note 32.
35. See generally PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 29-46 (1985).
36. See id. at 197-203.
37. In 1960, Canada enacted a statutory Bill of Rights, an Act for the Recognition and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1960, 8-9 Eliz. II, ch. 44 (Can.
Stat.) [hereinafter Bill of Rights] § 1(c) - (f), which recognized most of the liberties found
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and the desire to sever the final vestiges of colonial control by Great
Britain (still extant in the BNA Act) led to the adoption of the
Constitution Act of 1982.3' Adjusting the proper balance of power
between the provinces and the national government, especially in
light of Quebec's concern for the preservation of its French language
and culture, was the most salient political issue in the constitutional
debate.' But it was the adoption of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms41 that most significantly altered the role of the judiciary.
Individual rights guarantees are set out in Sections Two through
Twenty-Three of the Charter. Section Two protects those freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution: freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and
association." Sections Three through Five deal with "democratic
rights," protecting the right to vote and requiring that the House of
Commons and provincial assemblies be elected at intervals of no
more than five years.43 Section Six secures "mobility rights," roughly
comparable to what United States courts have called the right to
travel."
Sections Seven through Fourteen deal with "legal rights."
Section Seven guarantees "the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice."45 Sections Eight through
Fourteen deal with specific matters of criminal procedure, including
the right to counsel," security against unreasonable searches,47 and
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.48
Section Fifteen gives every individual "the right to the equal
in the United States Bill of Rights. It had, however, most of the attributes of an ordinary
act of Parliament; it could be repealed or amended through normal legislative processes.
Bill of Rights § 2.
38. See GALL, supra note 32.
39. Id.
40. See generally DAVID MILNE, THE NEW CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 23-46 (1982).
41. Canada Act, 1982, §§ 1-33.
42. Canada Act, 1982, § 2.
43. Canada Act, 1982, §§ 3 - 5.
44. "Mobility rights" include the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada and the
right "to move to and take up residence in any province." Canada Act, 1982, § 6.
Compare with Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (right of interstate travel implied
in the United States Constitution).
45. Canada Act, 1982, §7.
46. Canada Act, 1982, § 10(b).
47. Canada Act, 1982, § 8.
48. Canada Act, 1982, § 12.
[Vol. 28
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."'49
Sections Sixteen through Twenty-Three deal in great detail with
language rights, a subject of great importance both to the
Francophone minority nationwide and Anglophone minority in
Quebec.
In addition to these sections enunciating individual rights, several
charter provisions are of great significance in establishing the
framework for interpretation and enforcement of those rights.
Section Thirty-Two provides that, unlike the earlier statutory
Canadian Bill of Rights, the Charter limits both Parliament and the
provincial legislatures."' Section One, on the other hand, provides a
basis for judicial deference to legislative decisions. It establishes that
Charter rights are not to be considered absolutes, but are guaranteed
"subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."' 2
The most important departure from the United States model of
constitutional protection of civil liberties is found in Section Thirty-
Three of the Charter. In keeping with the Anglo-Canadian tradition
of parliamentary supremacy, that section provides that Parliament or
a provincial legislature may expressly declare in a piece of legislation
that it will be effective "notwithstanding a provision included in
section two or sections seven to fifteen .... , Such a declaration
expires in five years, unless it is re-enacted.m Thus, although Canada
has established for the first time the power of courts to invalidate
statutes based on their inconsistency with constitutional guarantees of
individual rights, judicial decisions are the final word on the subject
only in decisions concerning violations of democratic rights, mobility
rights and language rights.
49. Canada Act, 1982, § 15. In contrast to United States jurisprudence, a subsection
permits affirmative action, that is, government activity "that has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups." Id. § 15 (2).
50. Canada Act, 1982, §§ 16-23. See Joseph A. Magnet, The Charter's Official
Languages Provisions: The Implications of Entrenched Bilinguilism, 4 Sup. Cr. L. REv.
163 (1982).
51. Canada Act, 1982, § 32.
52. Canada Act, 1982, § 1.
53. Canada Act, 1982, § 33 (1).
54. Canada Act, 1982, § 33 (3) - (4).
55. Thus, the override provision does not apply to §§ 3 - 6, and § 16. See supra, nn.
43-50 and accompanying text.
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Section Thirty-Three, with its attempt to synthesize the power of
judicial review with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, is the
clearest departure from the United States' approach to allocating
final interpretive authority56 and is also probably the most
controversial aspect of the system established by the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. 7 These issues, however, are beyond the scope
of this article. Instead, our principal focus will be on Section One,
and its explicit call for a balancing approach in adjudicating rights
claims.
For the most part, the Bill of Rights provisions of the United
States Constitution do not speak in the language of balancing. With
the exception of the Fourth Amendment language limiting
unreasonable searches and seizures, the textual provisions seem to be
absolutes. While this is true with respect to a number of
constitutional provisions, it is perhaps most apparent in the language
of the First Amendment, with its command that "no law" abridging
the rights of free speech, press, or religion will be permitted!'"
Based upon the language of the two documents, we would expect
sharply different analyses, and presumably, sharply different
outcomes, in cases involving free speech rights. An examination of
the cases, however, shows that there is a surprising similarity in the
actual application of these differing textual standards. In the United
States, the utter impracticability of regarding the First Amendment as
an actual absolute has led to the employment of balancing tests, often
under the guise of categorization, rather than balancing. Thus, the
language of absolute principle may be retained, while in reality
something quite different is being employed. In Canada, we will see
that even courts explicitly authorized to engage in balancing interests
recognize the dangers of indeterminacy inherent in ad hoc
decisionmaking. In response, balancing tests will be employed that
will also suggest categorizations of cases and presumptions that lend
some degree of predictability to the analytical enterprise.
In 1986, the Canadian Supreme Court attempted to set forth a
general framework for the application of section one in R. v. Oakes 9
Once a claimant has established that a Charter right had been limited,
56. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (reiterating that the Supreme Court is the
final arbiter of issues under the United States Constitution).
57. For examples of the debate over § 33, see CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI,
JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER 199-211 (1993) and the sources cited therein.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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the burden of proof falls upon the government to establish "by a
preponderance of probability" two general things. First, the
government's objection "must be of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right and freedom" and it is
"[n]ecessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which
are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it
can be characterized as sufficiently important. ' The second step,
analyzing the means chosen to achieve the goal, itself involves three
inquiries:
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to
achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary,
unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must
be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means,
even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense,
should impair "as little as possible" the right or freedom in
question .... Third, there must be a proportionality between
the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting
the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been
identified as of 'sufficient importance.'6'
On its face, the Oakes test is quite stringent; it bears an obvious
resemblance to the strict scrutiny test set forth in United States
Supreme Court decisions.' But since its enunciation, the Oakes test
has come to be applied more flexibly, and therefore, less rigorously.6
The analysis of Charter rights claims under Section One, then, has
become rather openly a balancing test, with all the virtues and
drawbacks that such a test provides.
With this general overview of the Canadian approach to the
analysis of claims of individual rights as background, we can compare
the explicit balancing of Canadian courts with the more covert
balancing employed by United States courts in free speech cases. The
next sections will compare the approach of United States and
Canadian courts in deciding their respective leading cases in three
60. Id. at 138-39.
61. Id. at 139.
62. Justice Bertha Wilson, an advocate of strict application of the Oakes test,
analogized application of the Oakes test to the analysis performed by the United States
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Bertha Wilson,
Constitutional Advocacy, 24 OTTAWA L. REV. 265,267-68 (1992).
63. "I think it is now fair to say that, although the Court continues to pay lip service
to the strict Oakes test, in many of its judgments it has in fact applied it in a less rigorous
fashion," Wilson, supra note 62, at 269. See also Andrew J. Petter & Patrick J. Monahan,
Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1986-87 Term, 10 S.C. L. RaV. 61, 66("Faced
with Charter claims that involve controversial social issues and challenges to judicial
orthodoxy, judges have recoiled from all but the formal trappings of the Oakes test.").
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areas of recent, and continuing, free speech controversy: commercial
speech, hate speech, and obscene or pornographic speech.
I1. THE PROBLEM OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. The American Approach: Characterizing Advertising
Justice Hugo Black is perhaps best remembered for his insistence
that the apparently absolute language of the First Amendment, which
insists that Congress make "no law abridging free speech," should be
taken literally.64 And while his position was never adopted by a
majority of the Supreme Court, its consistency with the strong
libertarian strain in American political, and at least recently, legal
thought,65 has allowed it to leave its mark on First Amendment
doctrine.
Most significantly, Black and other absolutists were compelled to
define the categories of absolute protected speech much more
narrowly than those who would apply more flexible balancing tests.
Acts that threatened significant public harm could not be given
absolute constitutional protection, even if speech that did the same
could be protected. And so, the classification of activity as either
speech or action would become crucial. 66 Non-absolutists would also
feel compelled to classify types of speech, carving out categories, such
as obscenity, which is unworthy of full, or perhaps any, constitutional
protection.'
The earliest "commercial speech" cases categorized advertising
as merely part of the act of carrying on a business, rather than as an
independent act of communication. Thus, in Valentine v.
Christensen,6' the Court characterized the distribution of advertising
64. See HUGO BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45-63 (1968). See also Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)("Not only does [balancing
in free speech cases] violate the genius of our written constitution, but it runs expressly
counter to the injunction to Court and Congress made by Madison when he introduced the
Bill of Rights.").
65. For a critical overview of this strain of thought, see MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK 1-17 (1991).
66. See infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 221-232, and accompanying text. See also Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 948 (1982). (Professor
Aleinikoff, recognizing that assigning a lesser weight to a category of speech was a form of
balancing, adopted Professor Nimmer's label of "definitional" balancing to describe the
creation of First Amendment categories, in contrast with the "ad hoc" balancing of
interests on a case-by-case basis.).
68. 316 U.S. 52 (1942)(overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)).
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handbills as "pursu[ing] a gainful occupation" and the local ordinance
as the regulation of business activity.69 Only a few years before, the
Court had overruled the Lochner20 doctrine requiring heightened
scrutiny for government regulation of business activity under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1 It is unsurprising that
the Court would see Valentine through the prism of the longstanding
constitutional struggle over freedom to contract rather than the
relatively new debate concerning free speech.'
In 1949, the Court upheld a New York City ordinance limiting
advertising placed on business delivery vehicles without even
discussing the First Amendment. 3 Instead, the Court's analysis
addressed equal protection and general Fourteenth Amendment
liberty concerns.74 Advertising was not speech, at least not in the
constitutional sense. But in the 1970's, this clear principle would first
become murky and then become obsolete.
In 1975, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction of the
managing editor of a Virginia newspaper under a statute making it a
misdemeanor to advertise "or in any other manner, encourage or
prompt the procuring of an abortion."75  The paper had run an
advertisement for a New York abortion clinic.76 The Virginia
Supreme Court held that as "an active offer to perform a service," the
advertisement was commercial in nature, and therefore bereft of First
Amendment protection.'
During the time between the initiating of the prosecution and the
arrival of the case at the Supreme Court, Roe v. Wade established
that the state was constitutionally prohibited from banning abortion.
Although the Supreme Court noted that "this is a First Amendment
case" and "not an abortion case" its resolution did not ignore the fact
that this was not a case involving typical product or service
advertising.
69. Id. at 54.
70. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
71. Id. at 58.
72. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of
Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 747 (1993).
73. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
74. Id. at 108-111.
75. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,811-13 (1975).
76. Id. at 812. At the time of the advertisement, abortion was legal in New York, but
illegal in most states. See infra note 78.
77. 421 U.S. at 814.
78. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(recognizing constitutional right to obtain abortion).
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After stating that Valentine should be read not as supporting
"any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se ' 79
but rather merely to affirm "a reasonable regulation of the manner in
which commercial advertising could be distributed,"' the Court went
on to analyze the message conveyed by the abortion advertisement.
The Court noted that the advertisement "[d]id more than simply
propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual material of
clear 'public interest."'"" The "mere existence" of a legal abortion
clinic in New York was "not unnewsworthy" and since Roe v. Wade,
the activity advertised pertained to constitutional interests."'"
In addition, the Court characterized Virginia's statute as an
attempt to "acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of
another state" and to indirectly regulate legal activity in New York.'
Thus, the Court was unclear as to what extent this was a case that
turned on the existence of a fundamental privacy right,' the existence
of an element of "public interest" beyond commercial solicitation, the
improper regulation of interstate commerce at the state level,8 or
merely the heretofore neglected First Amendment protection of
advertising per se. In fact, the Court explicitly refused to "[d]ecide in
this case the precise extent to which the first Amendment permits
regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may
legitimately regulate or even prohibit.""
A year later, the Court unambiguously announced that
commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection, even
in the absence of any "cultural, philosophical or political"' overtones.
Virginia prohibited pharmacists from advertising price information
for prescription drugs.' The Court characterized the expression
involved as doing "no more than propos[ing] a commercial
79. 421 U.S. at 820.
80. Id. at 819.
81. Id. at 822.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 822-25.
84. 421 U.S. at 822 (referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, as a constitutional
interest).
85. "[A state] may not, under the guise of exercising internal police poNcrs, bar a
citizen of another State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in
that state." Id. at 824-25.
86. Id. at 825.
87. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. Inc., 425
U.S. 748,761 (1976).
88. Id. at 749-50. The statute was VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974).
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transaction," ' 9 merely communicating, "I will sell you the X
prescription drug at the Y price."' Both the individual and society
have "a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information"91
sufficient to make it a part of the "exposition of ideas"' entitled to at
least some constitutional safeguards. "So long as we preserve a
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private economic
decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed."'
At the same time, the Court acknowledged "common sense
differences" between commercial speech and non-commercial speech,
differences that "suggest that a different degree of protection is
necessary."' Yet apart from suggesting that states might limit false or
deceptive advertising95 the court did little to provide a framework for
analyzing commercial speech cases. 6 That task would be undertaken
in the 1980 case Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission.'
In Central Hudson, the Court articulated a four-part test for
determining when the government may restrict commercial speech.
The first part of the test is whether the commercial speech contains
false or misleading information, and whether it solicits lawful
activity.' If the communication in question fails this test, it will not
be given any constitutional protection." Second, in order for the
government to restrict non-misleading speech concerning lawful
activities, it must articulate a substantial government interest that can
be achieved by the restriction1 ° Third, the substantial government
89. 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rights Comm., 413 U.S.
376,385 (1973).
90. 425 U.S. at 761.
91. Id. at 764.
92. Id. at 762 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942)).
93. 425 U.S. at 765.
94. Id. at 771 n.24.
95. Id.
96. See id. The Court suggested that the differences between commercial and non-
commercial speech might justify compelling the commercial speaker to include additional
information in his message, and also might "make inapplicable the prohibition against
prior restraints."
97. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
98. See id. at 564-65.
99. See id. at 566.
100. See id. at 564.
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interest must "directly advance" the articulated government
interest."' Finally, if "the governmental interest could be served as
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech," then the
restriction must be struck down." This test, as articulated in Central
Hudson, appears to provide something close to the traditional strict
scrutiny analysis, at least on paper. 3
Subsequent cases seriously eroded Central Hudson's apparent
rigor. In Board of Trustees v. Fox, 4 the Court upheld the State
University of New York rule prohibiting commercial activity such as
Tupperware parties in dormitories. 5 More significant than the
holding was the fact that Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held
that the final step of Central Hudson did not require the state to
adopt the least restrictive means of achieving its purpose. Instead,
there need only be a showing that the restriction is "narrowly
tailored."'16 At the same time, the Court specifically warned that
narrow tailoring was "far different" from mere "rational basis"
analysis." Fox seemed to call for a case-by-case balancing test, with
all of the indeterminacy that such a test entails."
And in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico,"4 the Court demonstrated how sharply the balance might be
weighed in favor of a substantial state interest. The subject of the suit
was a Puerto Rican statute that permitted legalized gambling in
Puerto Rican tourist locations, at the same time prohibiting any
"gambling room ... to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities to
the people of Puerto Rico.""0. The prohibition on all advertising
addressed to residents of Puerto Rico arguably violated at least the
101. See id.
102. Id
103. The classic formulation of "strict scrutiny" requires that the government
demonstrate that it is pursuing a "compelling" interest and that the challenged statute or
practice is "necessary" to achieve that purpose. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Education, 476 U.S. 267,280 (1986).
104. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
105. Id. at 471-72. The regulation was State University of New York Regulation 66-
156 (1979).
106. Id. at 476-78.
107. Id. at 480 ("Here we require the government goal to be substantial, and the cost
to be carefully calculated.").
108. The outcome in Fox is difficult to reconcile with cases decided shortly thereafter.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 889-890
(1997).
109. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
110. Id. at 331-33.
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final step of the Central Hudson test. The Court held, however, that
where "the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition
on the underlying conduct," it must be authorized "to take the less
intrusive step" of banning advertising."' Posadas and Fox seriously
weakened the protection given to commercial speech. Very shortly
thereafter, the pendulum would swing back once again.
In 1993, the Court invalidated a Cincinnati ordinance that
banned the distribution of free advertising material from
"freestanding" newsracks located on public property."' The
ordinance did not ban the use of similar newsracks by traditional
newspapers."' The Court found a lack of reasonable fit between the
city's purpose of promoting the safety and aesthetics of public streets,
and the banning of only commercial, and not noncommercial,
newsracks. With respect to the government's purpose, there was no
valid distinction between the two types of newsracks, and the
commercial newsracks constituted only a small percentage of the total
number on the streets."4 In 1995, the Court struck down a federal
statutory provision that prohibited beer labels from stating alcohol
content."5 The statute was justified as prohibiting "strength wars,"
that is, beer sellers competing on the basis of having a stronger
product than the competition,"6 but the Court found that the statute
did not directly promote that interest. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens suggested that that part of advertising that merely
accurately describes the product should be entitled to full First
Amendment protection."7
In 1996, the Court struck down a Rhode Island statute that
prohibited price advertising for liquor."' The Court's decision in 44
Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island was unanimous, but the justices'
differing rationales revealed a divided Court. Four justices"9 adhered
111. Id. at 346.
112. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410,413 (1993).
113. The part of the ordinance cited by the city applied only to "commercial
handbill[s]." Id. at 413, n.3.
114. Id. at 425-26. The Court stressed that a municipality that demonstrated relevant
differences between commercial and non-commercial publications might be successful in
justifying disparate treatment, but that Cincinnati relied on no more than the "bare
assertion" that commercial speech was "low value" speech. Id. at 428.
115. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
116. Id. at 483.
117. Id. at 491-98 (Stevens, J., concurring).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 528-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
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to Central Hudson, but with less deference to the state than the Court
demonstrated in Posadas. "The ready availability of... alternatives"
such as legislating minimum prices or increasing taxes on liquor,
"demonstrates that the fit between ends and means is not narrowly
tailored.""12 Thus, the Posadas rationale that would allow a ban on
advertising merely upon a showing that the state might rationally ban
the underlying activity was rejected."'
Three justices " went a step further, rejecting the notion "[t]hat
all commercial speech regulations are subject to a similar form of
constitutional review simply because they target a similar category of
expression."' According to these justices, there are only two distinct
types of commercial speech, and only one of them is subject to a
reduced level of First amendment protection:
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer
information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the
reasons for according weaker constitutional protection to
commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review.
However, when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of
truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons
unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there
is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands.24
Justice Thomas went a step further, rejecting Central Hudson
completely, "at least when ... the asserted interest is one that is to be
achieved through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the
dark."' Thus, Justice Thomas came close to advocating full First
Amendment protection for commercial speech.2 6 Justice Scalia, in a
separate concurrence, voiced his dissatisfaction with Central Hudson,
but at the same time stated that in the absence of any attractive
Souter and Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
120. Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. "Since Posadas, however, this Court has examined more searchingly the State's
professed goal, and the speech restriction put into place to further it .... - Id. at 531
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
122. Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the Court, was joined in this part of
the opinion (Part IV), by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg only. IM at 489.
123. 517 U.S. at 501.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring).
126. "I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial'




alternative test, "our existing jurisprudence" should resolve the
case.
127
The current precise status of commercial speech in the United
States is somewhat unclear. But a few things are evident. Early
cases, apparently assuming an "all or nothing" position toward free
speech protection, reacted to the differences between advertising and
other forms of speech by categorizing commercial speech, and
declaring it outside the scope of the First Amendment. Subsequent
cases have progressively eroded the wall between the category of
commercial speech and the universe of fully protected speech. Still,
the Supreme Court has not eliminated the category entirely. Instead,
it has adopted a sort of balancing test. Although the justices are
divided on just what the terms of this test should be, it is surely less
protective than rigorous strict scrutiny, and it is also less determinate.
In this case, the movement from clear rules to a less determinate
balancing test has resulted in much stronger protection for the speech
in question than was once the case. But with the Court divided on
just how much protection commercial speech deserves, we can
confidently say little more than that. We now turn our attention to
recent decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court concerning
constitutional protection for commercial speech. How different is the
analysis of this area under a constitution that explicitly instructs
courts to balance rights and government interests?
B. The Canadian Approach: Balancing
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada was called on to apply the
Oakes test, and Section One in general, to the area of commercial
speech. The case of Irwin Toy, Ltd. v. Quebec,1" is particularly
interesting insofar as it addresses the question of advertising aimed at
children, a particular matter of concern in the United States. The
Quebec Consumer Protection Act129 prohibited, among other things,
most commercial advertising directed at children under the age of
thirteen.1" The ban was challenged by Irwin Toy, Ltd., as a violation
127. Id. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
129. Id. at 939.
130. Id. The section 248 of the Act provides: "Subject to what is provided in the
regulations, no person may make use of commercial advertising directed at persons under
thirteen years of age," and section 249 provides: "To determine whether or not an
advertisement is directed at persons under thirteen years of age, account must be taken of
the context of the presentation, and in particular of (a) the nature and intended purpose of
the goods advertised, (b) the manner of presenting such advertisement; (c) the time and
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of the Charter guarantee of freedom of expression."'
Initially, the Court held that commercial speech was within the
scope of the expression protected by the Charter."' It did so by
invoking a broad definition of the term: "if the activity conveys or
attempts to convey a meaning it has expressive content and prima
facie falls within the scope of the guarantee."'33 Thus, the Court not
only brought all categories of speech within the scope of the Charter,
but also took a liberal view of the "speech-conduct" distinction so
perennially troublesome in United States jurisprudence." With the
singular significant exception of violence, 35 even wordless physical
activity that clearly has "expressive content" receives protection.'
16
The Court was unanimous on this initial point." The next
question was whether the infringement was justified under Section 1.
The Court found that "[t]he protection of a group which is
particularly vulnerable to the techniques of seduction and
manipulation abundant in advertising"'" was a "pressing and
substantial" objective.' While the evidence that children at or close
to age thirteen are particularly vulnerable was weaker than that
involving children younger than seven, the Court held that the
legislature must have some leeway in setting the precise line at which
children will be protected." °
The Court had no trouble finding "that a bar on advertising
directed to children is rationally connected to the objective of
protecting children from advertising.'' 4. On the less obvious question
of whether the means chosen impaired the right of expression "as
place it is shown."
131. Id. at 938.
132. Id. at 967-71.
133. Id. at 969.
134. See supra note 10.
135. "While the guarantee of free expression protects all content of expression,
certainly violence as a form of expression receives no such protection.., it is clear, for
example, that a murderer or rapist cannot invoke freedom of expression in justification of
the form of expression he has chosen." [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 970.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 967-71 & 1007 (McIntyre, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 987.
139. Id. at 986.
140. "If the legislature has made a reasonable assessment as to where the line is most
properly drawn, especially if that assessment involves weighing conflicting scientific
evidence and allocating scarce resources on this basis, it is not for the court to second
guess." [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 990.
141. Id. at 991-96.
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little as possible," the Court chose something less rigorous than an
insistence on the least restrictive option. "While evidence exists that
other less intrusive options reflecting more modest objectives were
available to the government, there is evidence establishing the
necessity of a ban to meet the objectives the government had
reasonably set. This Court will not, in the name of minimal
impairment... require legislatures to choose the least ambitious
means to protect vulnerable groups." '
Under this standard, one remarkably similar to that employed by
the United States Supreme Court in Fox, the Court held that the ban
on advertising directed to children was justified, particularly in light
of the fact that advertisers could still direct their message to adults,
the presumed actual purchasers of the goods.'43 In a sentence that is
interesting for its reminder of the connection between communication
and action, the Court noted "[t]he real concern animating the
challenge to the legislation is that revenues are in some degree
affected."1" This is reminiscent of Valentine; a regulation of the act of
selling poses far fewer constitutional problems than a regulation of
speech. Where does advertising fit in this dichotomy?
The dissenters in Irwin Toy 45 and other cases demonstrate that
this Section One balancing test can be applied in ways favorable to
commercial speech. In Ford v. Quebec,46 the Court struck down
Quebec's statutory requirement that public signs and commercial
advertising be only in French.4  Clearly, this was an impairment of
expression, and so the case turned on Quebec's attempt to justify it
under Section One.'" While the Court accepted the objective of the
protection of the French language in Quebec as "substantial and
pressing,' 49 it found that the outright prohibition of any language
other than French was neither necessary nor proportional to
achieving the goal."54 "Thus, whereas requiring the predominant
display of the French language, or even its marked predominance
would be proportional... requiring the exclusive use of French has
142. Id. at 999.
143. Id. at 1000.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1005-9 (McIntyre, J., dissenting).
146. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
147. Id. at 787-88.
148. See [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 754-68.
149. Id. at 777.
150. See id. at 779.
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not been so justified."'5 ' Requiring all signs to include French,
perhaps in a more prominent way than other languages, would be an
easily achieved alternative.152
In Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons,"3 the Court
considered serious restrictions placed on advertising by dentists
pursuant to authority granted to the Royal College by the Health
Disciplines Act."M The regulation limited advertising to the name,
address, telephone number and office hours of a dentist, and also
regulated the "means and manner" of advertising, prohibiting any
conduct that would be reasonably seen as "disgraceful, dishonorable
or unprofessional."' 5  The Court had "no difficulty" in holding that
the objectives of maintaining high levels of professionalism and
protecting the public from misleading advertising were sufficiently
important to justify infringement of the right of free expression.'56
However, the Court found that the regulation was disproportionate to
its objectives, particularly in its limitation of the amount of accurate
information that a dentist could convey.' Again, the Court noted
that the motive of the advertiser is "primarily economic. '" But, at
the same time, "expression of this kind does serve an important
public interest by enhancing the ability of patients to make informed
choices."'5 9 Commenting on the best way to approach commercial
speech cases, Justice McLachlin wrote:
These two opposing factors - that the expression is designed
only to increase profit, and that the expression plays an
important role in consumer choice - will be present in most if
not all cases of commercial expression. Their precise mix,
however, will vary greatly, which is why I believe it is
inadvisable to create a special and standardized test for
restrictions on commercial expression, as has been done in the
United States.lW
Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court declined to create categories
of speech entitled to lesser forms of constitutional protection. But the
151. Id. at 779-780.
152. See id.
153. [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 232.
154. Id. at 237-39.
155. Id. at 237.
156. Id. at 250.
157. See id. at 250-51.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 247.
160. [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 247.
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test that all speech is subject to, including speech that United States
courts would categorize as commercial speech, is one that permits a
significant amount of leeway in balancing interests against free speech
rights. The language of Oakes is quite similar to the language of strict
scrutiny. Yet, Irwin Toy indicates that, as applied, the Oakes
framework is something less than full-blown strict scrutiny as found in
United States jurisprudence. Still, in light of the other leading
Canadian decisions striking down restrictions on commercial speech
and the current unsettled nature of United States case law on this
subject, it is not clear that there is a sharp difference between
Canadian and United States courts in the way in which they would
dispose of cases involving commercial speech. Justice McLachlin's
reference to the use of a "standardized test" in United States
commercial special cases suggests much more determinacy than we
have seen in the last twenty years of American commercial speech
jurisprudence. While we might speculate that Irwin Toy would have
been decided differently in the United States, it is quite possible that
most, if not all, of the other leading cases involving commercial
speech regulation in North America would have resulted in the same
outcome regardless of whether they had arisen in the United States or
Canada. A process of case-by-case balancing seems to be employed
by the Supreme Courts of each nation, and this leads to outcomes
that, while not entirely consistent, are also not radically different.
We will, however, see a much sharper difference in outcomes
when we turn our attention from commercial speech to the far more
contentious subject of "hate speech."
IV. THE PROBLEM OF "HATE SPEECH"
A. The American Experience
Words can hurt. They can cause not only psychological harm,
but they can also incite people to physical harm and other antisocial
acts. While this truism has been emphasized recently, it has been
recognized since the earliest days of First Amendment jurisprudence.
The several variations of the "clear and present danger" test161
161. The phrase was introduced by Justice Holmes in Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S.
47,52 (1919). A conviction based upon spoken or printed words could be sustained when
"the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent." Id.
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employed by the Supreme Court over the years62 have attempted to
reconcile this fact, and the power of government to prevent concrete
harm, with the First Amendment command that "no law" abridge
free speech.
The principle that speech may be punished when it presents a
"clear and present danger" of serious harm may be viewed in two
ways. On the surface, it may be seen as a clear choice of some form
of balancing test over an attempt to frame absolute rules. But, in its
stronger and currently invoked form, it may appear as an attempt to
preserve absolute protection of speech through categorizing some
utterances as acts, rather than "pure speech." Both Justice Holmes'
original formulation of the "clear and present danger" test 63 and its
current manifestation"I are strikingly similar to the common law test
for attempt.65 In other words, the thing being punished here might be
seen not as the utterance in itself, but rather an attempt to bring
about some non-speech outcome. Thus, "pure speech," that is,
speech not so closely linked to action that it becomes merely a part of
a non-speech act, may still be seen as receiving absolute protection.
When the Supreme Court first dealt with what we now call hate
speech, it did so not by balancing, or by reference to the generally
applicable "clear and present danger" test, but rather by explicitly
carving out a category of unprotected speech. In Chaplinsky v. New
Harnpshire,'6 the Court held that "fighting words," words "which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace,"' 67 were not within the scope of First
Amendment protection. Such words "are of such slight social value
162. In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919) and Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 671 (1925), the Court, over Holmes' dissent, held that the legislature could
determine that a category of speech presented real dangers, and could therefore be
criminalized. By the 1950's, the Court had disavowed Abrams and Gitlow, and returned to
insistence on a case-by-case analysis of the nature of the potential harm posed by the
speech, but in Dennis v. United State, 341 U.S. 494, 509-11 (1951), the Court held that an
extremely grave potential danger could justify state intervention long before harm was
imminent. In 1969, the Court adopted a stringent form of "clear and present danger,"
holding that that speech could be punished only "where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
163. See supra, note 155.
164. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
165. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 44-45 (1881). As a judge, Holmes
insisted that an attempt, to be punishable, had to be "very near to the accomplishment of
the substantive offense .... ." Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55, 56(1901).
166. 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942).
167. Id..
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as a step to truth that any benefit which may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."'6'
The language of Chaplinsky is intriguing. Although it stands for
the proposition that a category of speech is simply unprotected by the
First Amendment, the reasoning that benefits are "clearly
outweighed" by social interests, invokes the language of balancing.
Subsequent cases have raised serious questions whether, and to what
extent, there really is a "fighting words" exception to First
Amendment protection. In 1952 the Supreme Court narrowly
affirmed the conviction of a white supremacist under a statute making
it a crime to distribute material that "portrays depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue to a class of citizens of any race, color,
creed or religion," or which exposed such citizens "to contempt,
derision or obloquy."'6 9 The decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois,"'
tenuously upheld the power of states to punish "group libel," a
concept that draws upon traditional libel law (each member of the
group is harmed by the slur against the group as a whole) as well as
the rationale for banning "fighting words" or "hate speech;" verbal
attacks upon distinct groups of citizens can lead to civil unrest.1
But since Beauharnais, the scope of the state's power to prohibit
hate speech has been consistently narrowed. The Supreme Court has
held that "fighting words" do not include words that are merely
"menacing, insulting... or profane.'1 2  Courts and commentators
generally take the position that the "group libel" principle of
Beauharnais is no longer good law. 3
Most recently, in R.A.V. v. St. Paul,"4 the Supreme Court struck
168. Id.
169. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952) (quoting ILL. GRIM. CODE, ILL.
REV. STAT. 1949, c.38, § 471).
170. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
171. Thus, the Court relies on the language and rationale of Chaplinsky. See id. at 255-
57 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572); see supra text accompanying note 160-62. The
Court also speaks of the damage to the reputation of members of the group involved, in
traditional libel terms: "a man's job and his educational opportunities and the dignity
accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious group to
which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits," Id. at 263.
172. Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973).
173. "It may be questioned.., whether the tendency to induce violence approach
sanctioned implicitly in Beauharnais would pass constitutional muster today." Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978). But the case has never been expressly
overruled. See generally Hadley Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech:
Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 SuP. Cr. REv. 281.
174. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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down an ordinance criminalizing the placement on public or private
property of a symbol "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender.... "75 Four concurring justices
concluded that the ordinance was overbroad, extending its scope
beyond the unprotected "fighting words" exception, and should be
invalidated for that reason.76
The majority opinion took a different approach, finding that by
criminalizing only some, and not all, types of "fighting words," the
City of St. Paul had violated the First Amendment.'" Most
significantly, this opinion explicitly rejected the notion that the
"fighting words" category of speech is entirely outside the scope of
First Amendment protection. Instead, the categorization of the
speech limits the degree of protection; the Court held that within the
category of "fighting words," the government was required to
maintain neutrality.78
Thus, the category of "fighting words," now more commonly
designated as "hate speech," like commercial speech no longer lies
clearly outside the scope of First Amendment protection. Instead,
the categorization of speech merely gives guidance as to the type of
balancing to be undertaken. As with the commercial speech, the shift
from categorization to balancing has meant a broader scope of
protection for speakers. And, as was the case for commercial speech,
it remains an open question whether this is merely a stage in a shift to
full First Amendment protection, or whether R.A.V.'s principle of
"no favoritism within the category" is as far as the Court will go.
B. The Canadian Experience
Since the enactment of the Charter, the Canadian Supreme
Court has considered several cases involving government attempts to
punish "hate speech." These cases have primarily involved various
forms of anti-Semitism, neo-Nazi or Holocaust denial propaganda.
The Canadian court has been more willing than its United States
counterpart to permit government activity to punish such speech but,
consistent with the overall approach of the Charter, has not denied
175. Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL BIAS-MOTIVATED CRIME ORDINANCE, ST. PAUL,
MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
176. Id. at 397-415 (White, Jr., concurring); 415-416 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 416-36
(Stevens, J., concurring).




that such speech is entitled to some degree of constitutional
protection.
The leading Canadian case is R. v. Keegstra" Keegstra was a
high school teacher for twelve years in Alberta."' During that time,
he taught his students that Jews were "deceptive, secretive, and
inherently evil,"..' that they were "child killers," hungry for money
and power, who were responsible for wars, depressions, and other
social catastrophes." Students were expected to echo these teachings
on exams and in class.18
Keegstra was convicted of violating Section 319 of the Criminal
Code, which in relevant part, subjects to prosecution "[e]very one
who, by communicating statements, other than in private
conversation, willfully promotes hatred against any identifiable
group.""'  Section 319 does provide several defenses, most
importantly that the statement was true or believed to be true and
"relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion of which was
for the public benefit....
In considering Keegstra's appeal, the Supreme Court quickly
held that Keegstra's comments were within the scope of the Charter's
protection of free speech." Following the standard set forth in Irwin
TOY,I18 the only necessary inquiry, easily answered in the affirmative,
is whether the words " convey a meaning and are intended to do so by
those who make them."' Thus, unlike the "hate speech" analysis
applied in the United States, there is no issue of categorization; "the
type of meaning conveyed is irrelevant," and the fact that "the
expression.., is invidious and obnoxious is beside the point.""
Although acts of violence intended to express ideas - "violence as a
form of expression" - will not qualify for any Charter protection,
even "threats of violence" are not excluded. 19°
179. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
180. See Keegstra, [1990] 3. S.C.R. at 713.
181. Id. at 714.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 714-5.
185. Id. at 716.
186. Keegstra. at 729-30.
187. See [1989] 1. S.C.R. 927; see supra text accompanying notes 126-134.
188. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 730.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 732-33, quoting Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 970.
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But this merely leads to, rather than resolves, the central
question of whether the statute's infringement of free speech is
justified "as a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society."''
Chief Justice Dickson began by cataloging the values protected by the
guarantee of free speech. Initially, Dickson observed that "[a]t the
core of freedom of expression lies the need to ensure that truth and
the common good are attained. ... "'92 A position of complete
skepticism with regard to truth would lead to a position of absolute
protection of speech, since it is "impossible to know with absolute
certainty which factual statements are true, or which ideas contain the
greatest good."' 3 But the Chief Justice, while recognizing the need
for caution, still concluded that "[t]here is very little chance that
statements intended to promote hatred against an identifiable group
are true, or that their vision of society will lead to a better world."''
Even this cautious statement will be rather jarring to the student of
United States free speech doctrine; aside from the area of commercial
speech, United States courts feel compelled to refrain from
assessments of the truth of protected First Amendment speech.95
A second value promoted by free speech is "the vital role of free
expression as a means of ensuring individuals the ability to gain self-
fulfillment by developing and articulating thoughts and ideas as they
see fit."'96 Once again, while this value is clearly important, it cannot
be unlimited without resulting in a regime of absolute protection of
expression contrary to the balancing called for by Section One.
Finally, free expression is "a crucial aspect of the democratic
commitment," allowing everyone to participate in debate on public
policy, and "the use of strong language in political and social debate
- indeed, perhaps even language intended to promote hatred - is an
unavoidable part of the democratic process." Yet, Dickson
191. Id. at 734.
192. Id. at 762.
193. Id.
194. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 763.
195. Chief Justice Dickson discusses the American position on hate speech, [1990] 3
S.C.R. at 738-744. He stated that while he "found the American experience tremendously
helpful," he was "dubious as to the applicability" of American precedent in cases involving
hate speech. Id. at 741. Dickson also points out that even in American jurisprudence, the
process of categorizing speech to decide whether it deserves full or limited protection is
not entirely "content neutral," but "at least impliedly involves assessing the content of the
activity in light of free speech values." Id. at 742. In other words, even in First
Amendment cases, some form of balancing is taking place.
196. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 763.
197. ld. at 764.
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observed, this is not unlimited, since hate speech can be used "to
undermine our commitment to democracy when employed to
propagate ideas anathemic to democratic values."'98
Concluding that hate propaganda of the sort disseminated by
Keegstra did relatively little to further the goals of the free expression
guarantee, Justice Dickson found the prohibition rationally connected
to the "legitimate Parliamentary objective of protecting target group
members and fostering harmonious social relations in a community
dedicated to equality and multiculturalism."'199 The most problematic
part of the balancing test was the requirement that the legislation
minimally impair the right. Keegstra argued that the concept of
"hatred" was vague and overbroad. But the Chief Justice rejected
that argument, on the grounds that the provision "possesses a
stringent mens rea requirement, necessitating either an intent to
promote hatred or knowledge of the substantial certainty of such,
and... the meaning of the word "hatred" is restricted to the most
severe and deeply felt form of opprobrium."' Thus, the Court held
the provision, and Keegstra's conviction, validY2'
Justice McLachlin dissented, finding that the means employed by
Parliament were not proportionate to the ends of maintaining "social
harmony and individual dignity."' She concluded that the statute
was disturbingly vague and overbroad and also that experience in
other countries indicated that prohibiting hate speech had little actual
positive effect on reducing the incidence of hatred.'
Several months after Keegstra the Supreme Court considered
Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, which declares that
"[lt is a discriminatory practice.., to communicate telephonically...
any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or
contempt by reason of the fact that the person or those persons are
identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination, 21
The defendants' had been convicted of contempt for violating a
cease and desist order issued by the Federal Court of Canada finding
198. Id.
199. Id at 767.
200. Id. at 786.
201. See id. at 795-96.
202. Id. at 848 (McLachlin, J., dissenting).
203. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 854.
204. Canada Human Rights Commission v. Taylor [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 906-07.
205. John Ross Taylor was the leader of the Western Guard Party, a group
disseminating an anti-Semitic "white power" message. Id. at 904.
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that they had violated Section 13(1)."' In an opinion closely tracking
Keegstra, Chief Justice Dickson upheld the conviction and the
provision. while once again, Justice McLachlin dissented.2"
However, the balancing test is not always applied in a way that
upholds the statue or conviction in question. In 1996, the Supreme
Court overturned the conviction of a defendant who published a
pamphlet denying the existence of the Holocaust. ' This time,
prosecution was under Section 181 of the Criminal Code, providing
that "[e]very one who willfully publishes a statement... that he
knows is false and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to
a public interest is guilty of an indictable offense...." 21 0 Writing for
the majority this time, Justice McLachlin initially noted that Keegstra
was not controlling, since this case involved a different statute
prohibiting "a much broader and vaguer class of speech.- 11 Unlike
the relatively new statute upheld in Keegstra,212 Section 181 could be
traced back to the thirteenth century. 3 The purpose of Section 181,
held Justice McLachlin, was originally "to protect the mighty and the
powerful from discord or slander," not to protect vulnerable minority
groups.2"4 And even if social harmony were accepted as a justification
of Section 181, "the breadth of the section is such that it goes much
further than necessary to achieve its aim."215 A vast penumbra of
statements is prohibited well beyond those attacking vulnerable
groups, "merely because they might be thought to constitute a
mischief to some public interest.... "216
Justices Cory and Iacobucci dissented, arguing that a criminal
statute limited to the deliberate publication of false facts likely to
seriously injure a public interest, where each element must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, was no more than a "minimal intrusion
on the freedom to lie,"217 comparable to "provisions dealing with
206. See id.
207. See id. at 912-944.
208. See id. at 944-976 (McLachlin, J., dissenting).
209. See R. v. Zundel [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
210. Id. at 743.
211. Id.
212. See [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; see supra text accompanying notes 173-197.
213. See Zundel [1992] 2 S.C.R. at 744-45.
214. Id. at 765.
215. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. at 768.
216. Id. at 772.
217. Id. at 832 (Cory and Iocobucci, JJ., dissenting).
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fraud, forgery, false prospectuses, perjury and defamatory libel... ,,"8
But the decision of the Supreme Court here indicates that, as was true
in the case of commercial speech, the balancing test does not
invariably lead to affirming government action
When dealing with hate speech, then, the Canadian Supreme
Court has reached decisions in its leading cases that, while not always
upholding government restrictions, are more reminiscent of United
States decisions from the earlier era of Chaplinsky and Beauharnais
rather than the more recent precedent. These more deferential
Canadian decision have been reached through application of the
Oakes balancing test, while the early, deferential, United States
decisions, in contrast, were reached through the process of
categorizing "fighting words" or "group libel" as being simply beyond
the scope of First Amendment protection.
V. THE OBSCENITY/PORNOGRAPHY PROBLEM
A. United States Responses
As we have already seen, in recent years the United States
Supreme Court has abandoned, or at least seriously compromised,
the notion that certain categories of speech are not entitled to any
First Amendment protection. One excluded category remains,
however; it is still black letter law that obscene speech is unprotected.
But the surface simplicity of that statement has hardly led to clarity
and predictability. The Supreme Court, maintaining the language of
categorization, has struggled with the obvious necessity of balancing
interests in this area, and has produced results that have failed
entirely to satisfy either side of this issue.
In 1957, for the first time the Supreme Court was presented with
the issue of whether obscene speech constituted a distinct category
outside of the protection of the First Amendment. 19 The Court
endorsed the long-assumed idea that obscenity was unprotected, but
felt obligated to put forward a reason for that conclusion. Obscenity,
the Court held, did not deserve protection because it was without any
redeeming social value.' In defining obscenity, the Court narrowed
the common law meaning, and defined it as material which, taken as a
whole, appeals to the "prurient interest," that is "a shameful or
218. Id.
219. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
220. See id. at 484-5.
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morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.... ,"22
In the 1960s, the Court's initial explanation for why obscenity
was unprotected became a crucial part of the definition of the
category. Obscenity was now to be defined as material that not only
appealed to the prurient interest in a way patently offensive to
community values, but also was "utterly without redeeming social
value."'m This standard was highly protective of offensive speech, too
much so for the majority of the Court in the 1970s.
In the 1973 case of Miller v. California,- the Court set forth the
current definition of obscenity:
whether "the average person applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value. 24
By making the assessment of serious value, rather than the presence
of any value at all, a crucial part of the definition, the Court expanded
the scope of obscenity. This also clearly blurred the lines between
categorization and balancing. The value of the work in question must
be weighed, but rather than stating that this value would be balanced
against the likely harm or offense caused by the work, the Court
would instead determine whether the work was entitled to full or no
First Amendment protection. Certainly the question of whether a
work has serious social value is hardly less indeterminate than the
question of whether a work's value is outweighed by legitimate social
concerns.
Still, balancing requires weighing something against something
else. If Miller is in fact a balancing test, what is the social value of the
work to be weighed against? A suggestion can be found in the second
of the Court's pair of 1973 obscenity decisions, Paris Adult Theatre v.
221. Id. at 487, n.20 (quoting A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE §207.10(2) (TENT. DRAFT
NO. 6, 1957)).
222. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,419 (1966). Although only three justices
(Justices Brennan and Fortas and Chief Justice Warren) joined in the opinion setting forth
this test, it became the dominant test for obscenity, since Justices Black and Douglas, who
took even more protective positions with respect to obscenity, could be counted on to vote
along with the Brennan group to strike down prosecutions of any material not meeting the
standard.
223. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
224. Id. at 24.
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Slaton.' Earlier cases, searching for a rationale for excluding
obscenity from First Amendment protection, spoke of the value, or
lack thereof, present in the work at issue. This supposedly confines
analysis to the examination of the work, in some way, apart from its
social environment. But Paris Adult Theatre at least suggested that
the conclusion that obscenity was unprotected speech could rest not
upon a finding that obscene material had no value, but rather upon
evidence that it caused negative social effects.' While the evidence
of the causal link between obscene material and concrete social harm,
including but not limited to, sexual violence, is sharply disputed, 7 the
fact that the Court felt the need to point to it seems to indicate that
despite the language used by the Court, the determination of whether
to suppress allegedly obscene work is, on one level, a balancing test.
While Miller and Paris Adult Theatre clearly gave state and local
government more freedom to regulate obscenity, it is not necessarily
easy to satisfy the Miller test. Much material that a locality may find
offensive will still be found to have significant social value.' Local
legislation that has attempted to criminalize or create civil liability for
the dissemination of a broad category of pornography (going beyond
legally defined obscenity) on the grounds that it bears a causal
relationship to gender based violence or discrimination, has been
invalidated. 9
But at the same time, where government seeks to regulate
without imposing criminal sanctions, the Court has been willing to
weigh more explicitly the value of the expressive activity against
competing social interests. Thus, "indecent" speech may be regulated
as to time and place in a manner that is sensitive to content without
satisfying a rigorous test of strict scrutiny.' On its face, this would
225. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
226. See id. at 58-60. The opinion draws on the minority report of the President's
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography for its contention that there is an arguable
link between obscene material and crime or other "antisocial conduct."
227. See, e.g., GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A
FREE SOCIETY 74-108 (1988); RONALD J. BERGER, PATRICIA SEARLES & CHARLES E.
COTrLE, FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 93-109 (1991).
228. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (local standards cannot be used
to find award-winning mainstream Hollywood film to lack serious value); Luke Records,
Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing obscenity conviction of sellers of
major label rap recordings).
229. See American Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); aff.
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
230. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (approving
restrictive zoning of theatres exhibiting "adult" movies); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
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appear to be an attempt to create a third category somewhere
between unprotected obscenity and fully protected non-obscene
speech. But by declaring that sexually oriented speech, though not
without value, "is of a wholly different and lesser[] magnitude" than
other types of expression, 3' and creating another category, the Court
does seem to move in the direction of balancing on a case-by-case
basis, and away from the application of clear, categorical rules. Still,
as we will see, the United States Supreme Court has not gone as far as
the Canadian Supreme Court in explicitly weighing the potential
benefits of sexually oriented expression against its potential social
harms.
B. The Canadian Response
In light of the Canadian Supreme Court's approach to the issues
of commercial speech and hate speech, it should come as no surprise
that Canada has also given legislatures broader powers of regulation
with respect to obscene speech. The leading case under the Charter
on this issue is the 1992 decision of Butler v. The Queen, 2 a case both
praised and denounced for its receptiveness to recent feminist anti-
pornography arguments.
The Criminal Code of Canada prohibits the possession, sale and
public display of obscene material 33  The statutory definition of
obscenity is: "any publication a dominant characteristics of which is
the undue exploitation of sex or of sex and any one of the following
subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty or violence."' The use of the
word "undue" quite obviously creates serious vagueness problems,
but Canadian courts have attempted to provide "workable tests"235 to
determine the scope of that concept. Two of these tests are somewhat
reminiscent of concepts in United States obscenity law. First, a
depiction may "unduly" exploit sex in that it violates the
contemporary community standard of toleration. 6 One interesting
aspect of this test is that, unlike United States courts, Canadian courts
U.S. 726 (1978) (non obscene but "indecent" speech may be limited by FCC to hours
when children are unlikely to hear the broadcast); Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S.
560 (1991) (public indecency statute may be applied to nude dancing).
231. City of Erie v. Pap's A.Mi, 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000) (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at
70).
232. See [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.
233. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. c-46, § 163 (1985) (Can.).
234. Criminal Code, R.S.C.,ch. C-46, § 163(8) (Can.).
235. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 475-76.
236. See id. at 476-78.
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have stressed the distinction between that which offends the viewer
himself, and "what Canadians would not abide other Canadians
seeing.... " Only the latter, not the former, will violate this test.'
Also, whether the treatment of sex is "undue" may be subject to the
"internal necessities" test. ' 9 This would seem to bear some relation
to the United States' concept of significant redeeming value, but once
again, frames the question in a somewhat unique way. The question
here is "whether the exploitation of sex has a justifiable role in
advancing the plot or theme, and ... does not merely represent 'dirt
for dirt's sake' but has a legitimate role when measured by the
internal necessities of the work itself."240
The third test, one without a clear analogy in United States law, 41
is the "degradation or dehumanization test."'242 Perhaps less a
separate test than a subpart of the test of community standards, this
inquiry asks whether the material constitutes "the portrayal of
persons being subjected to degrading or dehumanizing sexual
treatment."24'3
Initially, of course, the Canadian Supreme Court determined that
offensiveness could not remove obscenity from the protection of the
Charter's speech provision. '  But once again, this leads not to
automatic invalidation of the prohibition, but rather to application of
the Section One balancing test. While the Court rejected the
contention that Parliament could justify infringement of a Charter
freedom by invoking merely "legal moralism,"'245 (the use of the law to
"impose a certain standard of public and sexual morality, solely
because it reflects the conventions of a given community,")" it
accepted as legitimate the Parliamentary goal of combating violence
"degradation, humiliation" and the maintenance of gender
inequality. 7 Having found that the prohibition of obscenity was
237. Id. at 477 (quoting Towne Cinema Theatres, Ltd. v. The Queen [1985] 1 S.C.R.
494,508-09).
238. See id. at 478.
239. Id. at 481-83.
240. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 483.
241. See supra notes 213-25 and accompanying text.
242. [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 478-81.
243. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 479.
244. See id. at 486-89.
245. Id. at 492-93.
246. Id. at 492.
247. Id. at 493 (quoting the REPORT ON PORNOGRAPHY by the Standing Committee
on Justice and Legal Affairs (MacGuigan Report) at 18:4 (1978)).
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rationally related to such goals, the Court turned to the question of
whether it advances them with minimal impairment to the free speech
right.
The Court concluded that the statute satisfied the test.2' In
doing so, it reviewed the existing tests for determining whether a
work is "undue exploitation," and concluded that under a synthesis of
the tests, only a minimal amount of material would actually be
proscribed. Here, the Court's balancing test employs its own process
of categorization, not to determine whether obscenity is entitled to
some Charter protection, but rather to determine whether the
questioned work falls within a statute reasonably limited to cause
minimum impairment of the free speech right. Justice Sopinka stated
that "[p]ornography can be usefully divided into three categories: (1)
explicit sex with violence, (2) explicit sex without violence but which
subjects people to treatment that is degrading or dehumanizing, and
(3) explicit sex without violence that is neither degrading nor
dehumanizing." 9 Pornography that falls into the first category "will
almost always constitute the undue exploitation of sex;"' work that
falls into the second category "may be undue if the risk of harm is
substantial;"' material in category three "is generally tolerated in our
society and will not qualify as the undue exploitation of sex unless it
employs children in its production." 2 In addition to all of this, the
Court noted that "materials which have scientific, artistic or literary
merit" do not constitute undue exploitation of sex; "the court must be
generous in its application" of this defense. 3
Both sides of the obscenity/pornography debate recognize that
Butler seems to grant Canadian legislative bodies far more leeway to
outlaw offensive material than exists in the United States.' 4 At first
glance, this seems puzzling. United States courts, as we have seen,
continue to maintain that obscenity is a totally unprotected speech
category; there is no such category under the Charter. While worded
differently, the tests used to determine what is obscenity,
constitutionally or statutorily, employ quite similar categorization
248. See id. at 504-509.
249. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 484.
250. Id. at 485.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 505.




tests. And while Canadian courts employ categories within an overall
balancing test, United States court clearly engage in some degree of
balancing within the iniquiry into how to categorize a challenged
work. Are the contrasting outcomes inevitable consequences of
constitutional language differences and differences in longstanding
modes of constitutional analysis? Are they inevitable consequences
of something else? Or are they not at all inevitable? In order to
answer these questions about the obscenity problem and other free
speech issues, we will now step back from examining particular
United Sates and Canadian cases on particular topics, and try to
formulate some general conclusions.
VI. FREE SPEECH BALANCING: RHETORIC,
REALITY AND CONSEQUENCES
For decades constitutional theorists have debated the relative
importance, both in theory and practice, of several factors in
constitutional interpretation.' As complex as this debate is, it is itself
ancillary to an even more controversial question: how much power
should non-elected judges have in shaping the law in a democratic
society. ' 6 For the most part, modes of constitutional interpretation
are supported or opposed on the assumption that they will provide
more or less restraint on judicial discretion.
Over the years, a number of analytical tools have been put
forward as providing not only the most theoretically justifiable, but
also the most effective restraints on judicial discretion. Some
advocate strict adherence to the constitutional text. 57 Others look to
history, either the intent of the framers' 8 or judicial precedent. 9 Still
255. Among the most prominent factors are the constitutional text, see Symposium
Textualism and the Constitution, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1081 (1998); ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23-47 (1997); history
and "original intent," see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L. 1085 (1989); LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMER'S CONSTITUTION (1988); moral reasoning, see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); pragmatism, see
Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1996).
256. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962);
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-15 (1958); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998).
257. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 248; Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 399 (1985).
258. See, e.g., Edwin Meese, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL. (1998); Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of the
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others suggest that the Constitution contains one or more overriding
values, and that maximizing these values is the proper interpretative
goal.2' ° To a greater or lesser extent, all of these theorists hope to
eliminate, or at least minimize, the ability of courts to engage in the
notoriously indeterminate process of balancing. Balancing, it is
thought, simply gives judges too much power to engage in the type of
decisionmaking properly left to accountable legislators.
The contrast between Canadian and United States approaches to
free speech questions provides us with interesting, if limited, insights
into certain questions. How important is constitutional text in
shaping outcomes and limiting judicial discretion? Is it really possible
to eliminate, or even sharply limit, the power of courts to engage in
balancing through either adherence to text or clearly defined,
judicially created analytical tests? Is balancing a threat because it
gives judges too much power, is it a threat for some other reason, or is
it no threat to democratic valves at all? And to return to where we
started, what does our examination of these approaches tell us about
the recent Supreme Court decision in Hill? Is it an anomalous
decision that has no meaning outside of the context of the abortion
issue, or does it indicate something significant about the Supreme
Court's approach to a broader range of free speech, and perhaps
other types of issues?
Lesson #1: Some Form of Balancing is Unavoidable
The Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms explicitly calls for
courts to engage in balancing. While certain provisions of the United
States Bill of Rights, such as the prohibition of "unreasonable"
searches,2 61 provide a textual basis for balancing, others, such as the
seemingly absolute language of the First Amendment, do not. But it
is quite clear that the United States Supreme Court has not rejected
balancing as a mode of First Amendment analysis. Even Justice
Black, known for his First Amendment "absolutism, ' 2 was able tomaintain that position only by categorizing some expressive activity
Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. REV. 811 (1983).
259. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1140 (1994).
260. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 249 ("representation reinforcement"); AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (popular
sovereignty).
261. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
262. See supra note 64.
rVo]. 28
as non-speech.263 Categorization itself would seem to be a process of
balancing, but on a wholesale, rather than a retail level. How
valuable, in light of the overall purposes of the free speech clause, is
this type of activity, and how detrimental is it to legitimate, non-
speech related social interests? And, of course, not merely the
"absolutist" Justice Black, but the majority of the Supreme Court has
engaged in the "wholesale balancing" of categorization over the
years, by creating categories of unprotected and lesser protected
speech, such as obscenity or commercial speech.' As we have seen
in looking at obscenity/pornography cases, the United States
Supreme Court asks many of the same questions when categorizing
that the Canadian Supreme Court does in balancing.
Even in cases where speech is not excluded from First
Amendment protection, the Supreme Court has not taken an
absolutist position. Instead, it has employed one or another test that
employs some type of balancing. Balancing may be employed in a
number of different ways, with more or less weight placed upon the
competing values. Thus, traditional strict scrutiny is a form of
balancing, not a per se test. Lesser forms of scrutiny are also types of
balancing tests. The choice is not between whether or not to use
balancing, but rather what form the balancing will take. To what
extent is this controlled by the text of either the constitutional
document, or another test articulated by the jurisdiction's highest
court?
Lesson #2: Language, Although Not Unimportant, Is Not Necessarily
Determinative
When the text suggests absolute protection of speech, as in the
United States, but practical considerations mitigate against
absolutism, we might expect some courts to adopt a form of balancing
likely to result in a great deal of protection for the individual. Indeed,
where state or federal government target speech based on content,
the Supreme Court is likely to employ the language of strict
scrutiny."' Here, then is where the text has its impact; explicit
endorsement of balancing will lead to a more lenient form of
balancing, absolutist language will lead to a more stringent standard
263. See supra note 10.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 64-125; 213-225.
265. Except, of course, where the Court has initially categorized the speech at issue to
be "non-speech" or speech entitled to less than full protection. See MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.07 (1984).
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of review.
But this theory must confront the fact that the Canadian
Supreme Court, in addressing the way in which its new powers of
balancing were to be employed, adopted a test in Oakes26 that on its
face is almost exactly that employed in the United States under the
banner of strict scrutiny. Yet under this test, the Canadian Supreme
Court has been significantly less protective of several types of speech
than has the United States Supreme Court. The stern words of strict
scrutiny, then, are no guarantee of an exceptionally high hurdle for
governments to clear.
And this is evident not only in Canadian jurisprudence.
Venturing outside the confines of the speech clause of the First
Amendment, we find a definite trend in United States constitutional
jurisprudence away from the notion that the invocation of strict
scrutiny is almost invariably fatal to the government's defense of a
statute or practice. From 1972 to 1990, the United States Supreme
Court employed the language of strict scrutiny in its analysis of claims
under the First Amendment clause guaranteeing free exercise of
religion;267 yet the Court consistently during this period sustained
government actions that had a negative impact on religion.26s When,
in 1990, a sharply divided Court abandoned the language of strict
scrutiny in free exercise cases, this history of deference to government
interests enabled Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, to claim that
the Court had never really adopted strict scrutiny in these cases at
all.269  In recent cases involving challenges to affirmative action
programs, the Court has adopted the language of strict scrutiny.
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor has gone out of her way to note that
strict scrutiny was not the equivalent of per se invalidity; instead,
strict scrutiny is a test that government may, in certain cases, satisfy."
At the same time, cases have emerged that challenge the notion
that application of low level scrutiny will invariably lead to judicial
266. See U.S. CONST. amend 1; [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; supra text accompanying note 2.
267. The strict scrutiny standard was established in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
268. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding military uniform
regulations against free exercise claim of right to wear a yarmulke); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1027 (1997) ("Other
than the employment compensation cases and Yoder, the court during this period never
found another law to violate the free exercise clause.").
269. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,882-84 (1990).
270. "[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in
fact."' Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995).
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affirmation of the government action in question.27 When we add
these holdings to the emergence of "middle-tier" scrutiny as an
appropriate constitutional test in some cases,2' we can see that the
use of easy categorization in American constitutional law cases, while
by no means a thing of the past, is gradually losing ground. And it is
being replaced in these cases by a type of analysis that focuses on the
particular facts of the case at hand, an analysis that certainly may be
regarded as a balancing test.
A very recent example of the United States Supreme Court's
growing tendency to prefer case-by-case balancing is the Court's
recent invalidation of the state of Washington's statute providing for
court orders of child visitation rights to non-parents. 3 Many saw this
as an opportunity for the Court to clarify some questions regarding
the scope of parental rights. Is a parent's right to make child-rearing
decisions a fundamental right, triggering the application of strict
scrutiny? If so, is the furtherance of the broadly defined "best
interests of the child"274 a compelling state interest sufficient to
override that right? But the Court left these questions open, holding
only that the specific statute in question went too far in granting
third-party rights.275 The analysis and outcome would be one that
easily could have been provided by a Canadian court confronting a
claim of parental rights.276
Does this mean that constitutional language is of no importance,
271. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (zoning
restriction struck down as failing low-level rationality test); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (state constitutional provision presenting legislature from passing anti-
discrimination laws protecting homosexuals struck down as failing rational basis test).
272. Most prominently, in cases involving gender discrimination, see Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also, Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (applying "intermediate"
scrutiny to statute distinguishing between marital and non-marital children).
273. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000).
274. See generally, Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975);
David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984), critiquing the use of the "best interest" test.
275. Although Troxel does speak of the "fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Id. at 2060, the
Court states that it "need not [ define.., the precise scope of the parental due process
right." Id. at 2064 since the statute can be invalidated because it is "breathtakingly
broad." Id. at 2061.
276. Recognizing the existence of a fundamental right, but then balancing it to
determine whether it is limited in a way proportionate to the state's legitimate goals is, of
course, the essence of the Oakes test. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1; [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103;
supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
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or that courts are free to make any issue indeterminate? We need not
go that far; surely the language of constitutional documents makes
many questions into "easy cases," 277 where, apart from cute mental
and linguistic gymnastics,278 courts will be constrained. But it is not
these cases that draw attention. Where cases are controversial and
stakes are high, the language of the constitution will leave room for
judicial balancing. Perhaps this was done intentionally, though the
conscious use of ambiguous language, '9 perhaps this will be a
consequence of judicial recognition that literal application of
language will lead to wildly impractical results. This latter instance
seems clearly to have been the case with respect to the United States
Supreme Court's attitude toward the seemingly absolute language of
the First Amendment. But the First Amendment's absolute
language, and the absence of any language authorizing a court to
balance might well account for the force that judicial balancing has
taken in the past. Balancing through categorization, and through the
frequent use of strict scrutiny at least gives the appearance that it is
something other than merely weighing conflicting interests.
Constitutional language, then, will have an effect on the way in which
the inevitable balancing of interests is carried out.
Lesson #3: Balancing Does Not Necessarily Increase Courts' Power
Over the Legislature
Language, whether that of the constitutional text, or of various
"strict scrutiny" formulations, will be interpreted in light of a nation's
history and legal culture. A comparison of United States and
Canadian Supreme Courts' approach to free speech balancing reveals
one striking point. Often, criticism of judicial balancing in the United
States has been associated with the position that balancing gives
courts too much power to frustrate legitimate majoritarian
decisions.' But in Canada, judicial balancing has been used to justify
277. See Schauer, supra note 250.
278. See, e.g., Jordan Steilker, Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Taking Text and
Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential
Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995) ("proving" textually that no president since
Zachary Taylor has been constitutionally eligible to serve in that office).
279. The most notable statement of the position that the framers intended to leave
later generations the freedom to develop the meaning of constitutional provisions is H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of the Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV.
885 (1985).
280. Thus Robert Bork argues that where judges may make choices among values, it
may easily lead to "minority tyranny." Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Edwin Meese argues that to permit courts to
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sustaining majoritarian decisions on controversial free speech
questions. Unsurprisingly, Canadian criticism of judicial balancing
has come from the libertarian side of the political spectrum.f 1
Judicial balancing, then, is clearly a two-edged sword. In
Canada, with its history of parliamentary supremacy, it is often used
to limit the scope of individual rights claims. In the United States we
see a different picture. In cases involving commercial speech and
hate speech, replacing allegedly clear categorical rules with more
open-ended balancing-type analysis has led to stronger protection for
the free speech right. But the Canadian cases remind us that case-by-
case analysis will not always lead to more libertarian outcomes.
Adding this insight to those outlined above will lead to our final
conclusion.
Lesson #4: Hill Is Not Inconsistent With the Overall Trend of United
States Free Speech Analysis
To the extent that First Amendment law is thought to consist of
sharply defined categories that lead to the application of highly
determinate analytical tests, Hill will seem troublesome. Although
not content-sensitive on its face, the statute at issue would seem to
clearly be content-sensitive in purpose and effect, calling for the
application, as the dissenters maintain, of strict scrutiny.
However, in several free speech contexts, the walls of previously
defined categories are breaking down, or being stretched. Previously
unprotected categories of speech, such as commercial speech and hate
speech, are now given some degree of protection. The sharp
distinction between the unprotected obscene and the fully protected
non-obscene has blurred, as the Supreme Court has wrestled with
"indecent" speech. At the same time, both in First Amendment and
other contexts, the consequences of applying strict scrutiny have
become less clear than before. The distinction between an always-
fatal strict scrutiny, and a never fatal rational basis test, that many
lawyers have long assumed, is no longer valid.
What seems to be happening in United States free speech
analysis, and perhaps elsewhere, is a drift toward the position
explicitly provided for in the Canadian Charter. Rights claims must
make constitutional decisions on the basis of imprecise calculations of fairness or decency
poses an unacceptable threat to legitimate majoritarian decisions. See Edwin Meese III,
The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L.
REv. 455 (1986).
281. See supra notes 62-63.
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be given a serious hearing, but serious countervailing social interests
may overcome them. Clearly, this is what the majority in Hill
recognize. Whether it is defined as privacy, health and safety, or the
abortion right itself, there is a powerful counterweight to set against
the limitation on free speech in this case. Hill is not an anomaly
resting entirely on the majority's commitment to abortion rights, but
rather one of a number of indications that United States free speech
law is moving away from a reliance on clear categorical rules, and in
the direction of case-by-case balancing. This will not necessarily
mean consistent victory for the government or for rights claimants,
but it will lead to a jurisprudence that will hesitate to make quick
judgments, whether they be libertarian (e.g., all content-based
restrictions are invalid) or majoritarian (e.g., hate speech has no
constitutional protection). In short, we can expect that free speech
analysis in the United States will become more like that used by the
Canadian courts. In light of different history and constitutional
traditions, this may not mean that outcomes will be the same, but
sharp distinctions between the explicit balancing approach of
Canadian jurisprudence and the more categorical approach of United
States courts can be expected to recede.
CONCLUSION
There is no reason to believe that the United States Supreme
Court has consciously looked to Canadian free speech jurisprudence
for guidance as it approaches controversial speech related issues.
Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that that is the case. Although it is
common for Canadian, and other common law countries, to draw on
United States precedent for persuasive argument,' United States
courts rarely return the favor. When Justices Breyer and Stevens
recently cited foreign authority in a dissenting opinion.' the majority
quickly dismissed the reference with an assertion that non-United
282. See L.S. U. C. v. Skapinker [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 367: "The courts of the United
States have had almost two hundred years experience.., and it is of more than passing
interest to those concerned with these new developments in Canada to study the
experience of the United States courts." This, of course, does not necessarily mean that
Canadian courts will follow United States precedent:
While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer to American
constitutional jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter
guarantees that have counterparts in the United States Constitution, they should
be wary of drawing too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different
countries in different ages ....
R. v. Rahey [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588,639.
283. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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States sources were of absolutely no help in interpreting the United
States constitution.2
But foreign sources, particularly those from jurisdictions that
share much in the way of legal and non-legal culture with the United
States, can often provide insight, not only into alternatives to current
United States legal approaches, but also into explanations of current
United States decisions that may not be obvious on their face. While
Hill is problematic in light of much United States free speech
precedent, it is entirely consistent with the type of Charter balancing
that a Canadian court would apply. When lawyers and scholars ignore
developments in other nations with systems of judicial review, they
deny themselves access to potentially enlightening material.
284. See id. at 921 n.11.
Winter 20011 CLEARLY CANADIAN
234 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 28
